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ABSTRACT
Business incentives have brought us within a small factor
of achieving the database community’s Grand Challenge set
out in the Asilomar Report of 1998. This paper makes the
case for a new, focused Grand Challenge: Public Health for
the Internet. The goal of PHI (or ϕ) is to enable collectives
of hosts on the Internet to jointly monitor and promote net-
work health by sharing information on network conditions in
a peer-to-peer fashion. We argue that this will be a positive
effort for the research community for a variety of reasons,
both in terms of its technical reach and its societal impact.
This version of the ϕ vision is targeted at readers in the
database research community, but the effort is clearly mul-
tidisciplinary. A more generalist version of this paper will
be maintained at http://openphi.net.
1. RALLYING A DIVERSE COMMUNITY
We recommend a ten-year goal for the database research
community: . . .Make it easy for everyone to store, organize,
access, and analyze the majority of human information on-
line.
– The Asilomar Report on Database Research
Google’s mission is to organize the world’s information and
make it universally accessible and useful.
– Google Corporation
The database research community is well-regarded in com-
puter science circles for its focus and relevance. Part of this
reputation comes from the periodic reports reflecting the
consensus of community leaders, which serve both to rally
the community internally, and to present a united front to
colleagues, funding agencies, and industrial partners. To-
day, the community’s focus and relevance are being chal-
lenged on two fronts: the technology business climate, and
the academic research climate.
In 1998, the Asilomar Report laid out a Grand Challenge
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for the community, quoted above. Nine years later, this
challenge is remarkably close to the corporate missions of
major Internet services, which are widely viewed – even
within much of the computer science community – as having
made significant progress toward addressing the challenge.
Some database cognoscenti quibble with the completeness
of these efforts to date, particularly as regards structured
data. However, a number of other well-known database re-
searchers are voting with their feet, leaving prestigious aca-
demic and industrial research posts to join the staff at these
companies. Efforts toward publishing, hosting and integrat-
ing structured data on the web are well underway. In short,
even if one does not believe that the Asilomar Challenge
is completely solved, it appears that the goal of enormous
advertising revenue will drive this agenda forward naturally
and aggressively. This is no longer a Grand Challenge for
Science. This is Business, and it is in full swing.
In parallel with this development, the last decade has seen
remarkable growth in the database research community, both
demographically and intellectually. Universities in Canada,
Singapore, and India now boast database groups bigger than
the traditional leaders in the U.S. and Europe, and pro-
duce quality research publications and students accordingly.
Meanwhile, the database community’s technical focus has
grown to overlap significantly with areas as diverse as statis-
tical machine learning, networking, security, and computa-
tional biology, in addition to traditional overlaps with oper-
ating systems, programming languages, computer architec-
ture, and theoretical computer science. These developments
are both exciting and welcome. But they significantly strain
the community’s traditional ability to achieve research focus
and, by doing so, to forcefully drive technology development
and transfer.
The Asilomar Report was the last major effort by the com-
munity to produce a Grand Challenge, however vague1. In
this paper we begin a discussion of a new agenda we call
Public Health for the Internet (PHI or ϕ). We hope that
ϕ can serve as one of a few rallying points for the grow-
ing community of database researchers, based on important
technical and societal agendas.
1The Lowell Report in 2003 [1] included many technical chal-
lenges, but no single motivating Grand Challenge.
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1.1 Parameters of the Grand Challenge
Every generation needs a new revolution.
– Thomas Jefferson.
A successful Grand Challenge must inspire and focus the
community of scientists and engineers. Before proceeding
to describe our own proposal, we sketch some considerations
that we think are useful for today’s community of Informa-
tion Management researchers. These stand in contrast to
earlier challenges in database research, both in motivation
and in the technical agenda.
1.1.1 Motivation: The Common Good
Departing from the roots of database research in business
data processing, we would like to see the next Grand Chal-
lenges have a direct, positive outcome for society. The grow-
ing scientific community in this area could use a motivation
beyond advertising and service revenues, which have lately
become the main drivers for the software industry. Arguably
the best such motivation is one that affects the daily lives
of ordinary people, starting with the scientists themselves,
expanding out through their peers and families to the com-
munity at large. It is also important that the challenge have
a crisp mission statement, which can engage both technical
and non-technical audiences – from funding agencies to tax-
payers to school children. Of course, commercial benefits are
likely to ensue if the social benefits are compelling. After a
period of open innovation, one efficient means for promot-
ing the common good may be to harness the efficiency of
the marketplace.
1.1.2 Technical Parameters
All Grand Challenges need to seek fertile ground between
the clearly trivial and the truly impossible. To draw in
the breadth of today’s diverse database research commu-
nity, any new Grand Challenge should have many points of
attack from a wide technical territory, differing in the dimen-
sions of both technical areas and research methodologies. To
focus this discussion, we highlight three distinguishing “rev-
olutionary” themes for the next Grand Challenges:
Architecture: The Revolution Will Not Be Centralized2
As noted above, there are already strong incentives for an
individual business (and, more quietly, an individual gov-
ernment) to collect, crawl, index and mine large volumes of
information. To exercise new architectural and algorithmic
ideas, a revolutionary system should not run in a single en-
terprise’s hosting facility. It should instead target massive
distribution and the participation of multiple parties. These
requirements are not exotic. They arise in a variety of set-
tings that involve some combination of (1) distributed data
gathering, (2) real-time querying, triggering and dissemi-
nation, and/or (3) limited trust and access due to diverse
economic or political goals.
Incentives: The People, United, Will Never Be Defeated3
To drive a massively decentralized revolution, three factors
must come into play. First, the application has to be at-
tractive to a large, geographically distributed user base who
2“The Revolution Will Not Be Televised” – Gil Scott-Heron,
1971.
3“El pueblo unido jama´s sera´ vencido” – Sergio Ortega,
1973.
will want to provide data and a workload. Second, the in-
formation in aggregate has to be more powerful than it is
when isolated. Finally, that power should accrue directly to
the parties providing the data. Otherwise other economic
means (payment, free services) have to be used to provide
incentives, and these approaches are typically too indirect
and complex to be used in framing a Grand Challenge for
Science.
Information: Information is not Knowledge4. Knowledge
is Power5. With great power comes great responsibility6.
Efforts to unify information from many parties are inher-
ently messy. On one hand, there is the difficulty of the
problem: information at a global scale is always incomplete,
rife with inaccuracies and misrepresentations, and varied in
its representation. On the other hand, there is the dangerous
potential power of a solution: the goal of personal privacy
seems to work against a vision of exposing massive amounts
of information to the public. In our view, a new Grand
Challenge for Information Management should encompass
these important problems, and encourage researchers to seek
firm and fertile ground between the quicksand of the techni-
cal and societal challenges involved in massive information
sharing. The Grand Challenge should entail a sufficiently
structured environment so that integrating information and
inferring knowledge are challenging but tractable. It should
also include the problem of protecting and validating the
preservation of individual privacy.
Given a Grand Challenge with these parameters, many of
the community’s current research topics could be brought
to bear: data mining, data privacy, distributed query pro-
cessing and optimization, stream and event processing, data
integration, data reduction, probabilistic data and inference,
and so on. Moreover, there is room for contributions from
multiple research styles, including system building, perfor-
mance analysis, and theoretical investigation. What remains
is the need for a specific, focused Grand-Challenge State-
ment that will rally the community to collectively target its
skills to specific goals, and have a yardstick by which to
measure progress.
2. PUBLIC HEALTH FOR THE INTERNET
With this introduction, we now turn our attention to our
specific proposal for a new Grand Challenge. We begin with
a simple mission statement, intended to convey the main
idea of the challenge to a casual listener. We then move on
to a somewhat more nuanced and detailed description.
2.1 The Elevator Pitch
The ϕ Grand Challenge: Computers on the Internet
should organize themselves into a worldwide community watch,
tracking and containing the spread of viruses, worms, spy-
ware and other harmful traffic. This should be done without
sacrificing end-user privacy or autonomy, and without plac-
ing undue responsibility or control into the hands of any one
party.
4Attributed to Albert Einstein. Also, “Information is not
knowledge. Knowledge is not wisdom. Wisdom is not truth.
Truth is not beauty. Beauty is not love. Love is not music.
Music is the best.” – Frank Zappa, Joe’s Garage, 1979.
5Sir Francis Bacon, Meditationes Sacrae, 1597
6Uncle Ben, Spider-Man, 2002.
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2.2 The One-Pager
Internet security is perhaps the key challenge facing comput-
ing today. It has been estimated that Internet “malware”
(viruses, worms, spyware and the like) cost global businesses
between 169 and 204 billion dollars in 20047, despite signif-
icant rollouts of Internet security software [14]. It has also
been convincingly argued that the entire Internet could be
taken over by a worm in just minutes [28].
Internet security is often cast in terms of medical analogies:
viruses, vaccines and the like. Medicine is a useful analogy,
but as a discipline, medicine works by curing individuals,
and focuses less on widespread problems. The complemen-
tary field of Public Health takes a more population-focused,
community-oriented approach. Public Health research of-
ten focuses on understanding and mitigating the spread of
disease in a population. The Internet is a shared medium,
and it is time that Internet security shifts to analogies from
Public Health rather than Medicine.
Public Health for the Internet (PHI, or ϕ) is a scientific
challenge for the computer science community. The goal
of PHI is to enable machines on the Internet to band to-
gether into a “community health watch” infrastructure that
aggressively shares, analyzes, and acts upon information ob-
served at the various machines. The end result should be a
global Internet that is smarter and stronger than any subset
of compromised or malicious nodes within it, while ensuring
the efficiency, privacy and autonomy that users expect of a
global, public medium.
The technical key to the PHI vision is the sharing of rich,
rapidly-evolving information across the masses of computers
connected to the Internet. It is becoming increasingly appar-
ent that the only reliable place to check for malicious traffic
is at the endpoint destinations of the traffic. Traditionally,
networks depended on “border security” such as firewalls,
which funneled traffic through checkpoints that could pre-
vent unwanted traffic from entering sheltered subnets. This
approach has broken down with the prevalence of mobile
computers that bring in malware from outside the firewall,
and web services like email that “tunnel” malicious traffic
through firewalls.
PHI would allow endpoint traffic observations to be shared
across machines for the common good, enabling all users to
benefit from the collective information gathered by the full
population. To be effective, this information would have to
be shared extremely quickly: fast enough to keep up with
malicious network traffic. It would also have to be shared
securely, so that attackers would be unable to bypass the
defense mechanisms, or subvert their purpose and turn them
into counter-intelligence services or even weapons of attack.
Sophisticated analyses would have to be run on the data
and the results shared in real time. Finally, all sharing of
information would need to be done without compromising
the privacy and autonomy of the users of the network.
One proposal for achieving this vision is to build a “Center
for Disease Control” for the Internet [28] that gathers re-
ports from all the machines on the network, analyzes them,
7N.B.: Roughly an order of magnitude more than database
industry revenues.
and disseminates warnings or commands. The problem with
this approach is basic: who runs the Center, and what do
they Control? In an era of increasing concern over govern-
ment subpoenas, individual privacy, and corporate liability,
the idea of centralizing Internet security in the hands of a
few large organizations seems politically intractable.
Instead, we believe the time is ripe, both technically and po-
litically, to get the Internet’s end users to band together in
a global peer-to-peer (P2P) system that monitors the Inter-
net at scale – with neither a Center nor any explicit Control
of the system. The incentives for end users are clear: more
security and hence less hassle, without having to trust a cen-
tral authority. There are also incentives for vendors of the
end users’ PCs, operating systems and home routers, who
are looking to differentiate their products with new network
security features. Finally, enterprises can use PHI technol-
ogy internally as a way to replace their crumbling firewalls.
As an added incentive for end users, PHI software could
provide them with better understanding of their local ex-
perience by reference to the global, shared information: for
example, to compare whether the sites attacking them are
also attacking others, and characterize what aspects of their
system are attracting attack. This can allow users to bet-
ter answer questions like “Why is my computer behaving
strangely?”, “Am I being targeted?”, “Is this machine con-
tacting me a ’bad guy’?”, or even “Is it really critical that I
upgrade my software?”
In our vision, the ϕ software base would consist of (a) a va-
riety of network “sensor” software modules at the endpoints
that gather and ingest key network security and performance
characteristics at each endpoint; (b) a peer-to-peer protocol
and compliant software that would allow machines to col-
laboratively analyze this information across the collective,
disseminating important information, triggering automated
responses, and answering user queries; and (c) useful and
attractive end-user interfaces – both to incent users to join
the collective, and to encourage them to be more proactive
about securing their own machines.
3. A SAMPLING OF RESEARCH ISSUES
The ϕ Grand Challenge is hard, and parts of it will be
unfamiliar to a database audience. For example, some low-
level aspects of it have to do with the internals of Internet
protocols that do not significantly touch on the core com-
petencies of this community. However, a key component of
the ϕ challenge involves distributed, real-time information
management. The traditional database research community
could profitably set many of its current areas of research in
this context, and in doing so make a tangible difference in
the computing experience of users worldwide. In this sec-
tion, we highlight a number of research problems that have
occurred to us in our initial efforts. We also fully expect
that there are many other issues we have not even begun to
consider. Indeed, our hope is that this is the beginning of a
conversation with many participants.
3.1 Massively Distributed Stream Processing
The driving data model for a ϕ system will inevitably be one
of distributed streams of data coupled with historical repos-
itories. The streams will come from a variety of distributed
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sources, including packet traces, firewall log events, operat-
ing system logs, and possibly the logs of popular networked
applications like browsers, communication tools (chat, net-
work telephony), online media players, and peer-to-peer ap-
plications. There is also a role for stored data, which may be
at the endpoints, but which also may come from network in-
frastructure, including routers, Internet “Weather Services,”
and potentially shared archives of prior observations.
The collective system needs to be able to process such streams
of data in a variety of ways. For the most part, we do not ex-
pect users to explicitly interrogate the health of the network
on a regular basis. Instead, the information processing in a
ϕ system will mostly be data- and event-driven. This re-
quires communication-efficient techniques for massively dis-
tributed, shared “triggers” or “event processing.”
As a modest example, we consider the problem of quickly
determining the origin of a network worm. An incoming
network packet at one node might trigger a traditional lo-
cal firewall rule that recognizes the worm. Then the system
might autonomously engage the packet’s sender in a back-
trace of the origin of the worm. This has been shown effec-
tive using centralized packet traces [30]. In the ϕ context,
this amounts to an Event-Condition-Action rule in which the
Event detection (packet arrival) and the Condition checking
(firewall rules) are local network logic, and the Action is a
distributed transitive closure query that computes the an-
cestor relation for the packet across multiple nodes.
A more complicated family of triggers requires that the con-
dition in the Event-Condition-Action cycle be checked glob-
ally in the face of frequent events. As an example, consider a
distributed traffic governor that tries to ensure that a large
coalition of compromised PCs (a so-called “botnet”) cannot
be utilized for Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks
– such logic could run reliably on network interface cards,
for example. This governor would need to trigger if an ag-
gregate of traffic across all nodes goes above a threshold for
any destination IP address on the Internet; in a SQL-like
syntax, this condition would be
SELECT destination FROM packetstream
GROUP BY destination
HAVING COUNT(packets) > X
Efficiently tracking such aggregate quantities across distributed
nodes is a difficult challenge. It has been addressed algorith-
mically by a number of recent database and networking pa-
pers [2,3,13], but to date these ideas have not been seriously
explored in a workable system.
Another recent example arises in the analysis of the network-
level behavior of spammers. It is commonly thought that
modern spam is largely delivered by botnets. In a foren-
sic study of archived data, Ramachandran and Feamster
validated this belief, and found that the distribution of in-
fected bot machines in the network was non-uniform and
detectable, even though activity as a spammer is transient.
They hypothesize that “the uneven distribution of spam and
botnet activity across IP space – and the differences in this
distribution from legitimate email – suggests that spam fil-
ters and intrusion detection systems might monitor network-
wide spam arrival patterns for changes in these distributions
to detect anomalies such as a surge in spam activity.” [23]
Achieving this goal requires near-real-time distributed mon-
itoring and querying to compute a distribution of hosts send-
ing spam; this distribution is laid out on the hierarchical ID
space of Internet addresses, which has particular properties
that motivate specialized data reduction techniques [25].
More recently, it has been suggested that distributed track-
ing of simple aggregates like COUNTs can be used as a ker-
nel for approximately tracking more sophisticated statistical
shifts in network traffic [10]. The challenge here is more like
real-time distributed data mining: to identify “surprising”
shifts in the patterns of Internet traffic, which may indicate
the emergence of new as-yet-unrecognized worms, the trig-
gering of botnet attacks, or simply a shift in the Zeitgeist of
Internet users. Recognizing and responding to these shifts
is an important part of making a ϕ infrastructure resilient
to the shifting nature of the network and its population.
These problems drive a new generation of database query
processing challenges, which will require a combination of
distributed system design, efficient approximate query pro-
cessing, and a new class of multiquery optimization and in-
formation dissemination that can collectively monitor and
report on variants of such queries for millions of end users.
The surface of this problem has been scratched, and it is
clear there is much more to be done.
3.2 Network Design for Distributed Queries
Any massively distributed system needs to coordinate the
communications of its members. That means it must find
efficient ways to dynamically track the addresses of the par-
ticipants as they come and go (network “churn”), and route
communications between pairs of participants that may not
know of each other’s presence. This is the domain of overlay
networks, which has received significant research and com-
mercial attention in recent years.
While this topic has been explored largely outside the database
research community, P2P filesharing explicitly blurred the
distinction between network routing and distributed queries.
P2P filesharing treats routing as an entirely content-based
problem: query messages should be routed to nodes that
have matching data. It similarly blurs network “topology”
(the shape of the network graph) with querying: the overlay
network graph should try and keep nodes with related con-
tent and queries well connected to each other. This idea was
addressed more formally for doing content-based routing for
equality predicates, in the Distributed Hash Table (DHT) lit-
erature [24, 26, 29], as well as in various proposals for range
predicates. In essence, overlay network design has evolved
into a distributed indexing problem, which has caught the
attention of a breadth of researchers in databases, networks,
systems and algorithms.
If there is one key lesson from the early days of query op-
timization, it is that no single index structure or join algo-
rithm is always best, and that a good system should employ
a family of indexes and algorithms, choosing among them
to best suit a workload. This idea has yet to be explored
seriously in the context of distributed queries. In our own
work on the PIER engine, we took the route of trying to
achieve multiple behaviors on a single DHT network [11].
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An intriguing alternative is to return to database systems
roots, and maintain – or perhaps construct on-the-fly – a set
of many custom overlay networks to suit particular queries
or workloads. For example consider a query with an equal-
ity join and an aggregation. Gossip could be used for query
dissemination, a DHT could be used for the join, and a
custom tree could be built for performing the aggregation.
Ideally, of course, these decisions are made by a query opti-
mizer, which for continuous queries would also need to adap-
tively change the plan in response to changing conditions.
In essence this agenda couples database query optimization
with overlay network design. The problem becomes only
richer and more interesting when multiple ongoing queries
are taken into account, which is the realistic setting for ϕ.
One direction we have pursued in this regard is Declarative
Networking, in which a recursive query language is used to
specify the implementation of an overlay network [17–19].
To date we have demonstrated that declarative languages
for overlay networks can specify a broad range of overlay
network protocols in orders of magnitude less code than tra-
ditional programming languages. As one example, we have
a running implementation of the Chord overlay [29] that
consists of a 41-line logic program, running within our P2
system for declarative networking [18] . Our implementation
in the P2 system compiles that program down to a dataflow
graph akin to a query plan, which results in an executable
that combines the logic of a configurable network router like
Click [16] with a networked query engine like PIER [11]. Not
only does this bring the power of declarative languages to
the construction of distributed systems, it opens up the pos-
sibility of automatically co-optimizing the overlay network
and the query functionality in a single framework.
3.3 Privacy and Security
Privacy has been a hot topic in the database community in
recent years. But it is a slippery topic to scope carefully.
In some contexts, legal frameworks provide guidelines – the
European Union has extensive rules on data privacy, and the
US has policies in place for some domains like healthcare.
A key challenge in defining “useful” digital privacy work
is to understand what people actually want. Indeed, most
people can only express this by discussing examples of infor-
mation they would not like to reveal to particular parties.
Undoubtedly the best way to get ground truth while respect-
ing people’s privacy desires is to offer them the opportunity
to share their data on their own terms. This is not the kind
of experiment that is easy for scientists to arrange at all, let
alone in a way that sidesteps liability issues.
P2P systems offer such an opportunity. However, there are
few P2P systems that promote a social good; SETI@Home
may be the best example, but it is computation-intensive
rather than data-intensive, and hence has minimal privacy
implications. ϕ is a setting in which computer scientists in-
terested in protecting privacy can engage with users who are
interested – for the best of reasons – in sharing their private
information, but in a variety of controlled ways. The appli-
cation requires the development of policies and algorithms
for guaranteeing limited exposure, and for allowing users to
verify adherence to protocol. As a form of bootstrapping,
very simple controls and sharing incentives can be offered to
open-source ϕ software users who “opt in” to the system.
But if the technology is to eventually be bundled in prod-
ucts (e.g., network cards or routers), more robust techniques
will be required to maximize user trust and minimize vendor
liability.
3.3.1 Verifiability and other Security Issues
The database community’s efforts on privacy have largely
addressed the security of stored data, and the way data is
exposed – to queries, and to federated query engines during
query processing.
Somewhat surprisingly, the community has all but ignored
the question of verifiability: whether the answers to dis-
tributed queries are correct. This is a critical concern in any
distributed system in which the query processing is shared
among the parties. It is certainly a key issue in a ϕ im-
plementation, since malicious parties on the Internet have
every incentive to mask their behavior (and, perhaps, that of
others) by computing and/or propagating incorrect results.
We have some initial results in this regard that suggest there
is significant room here for innovation. Our work on Proof
Sketches [8] can be used to verify the output of distributed
aggregation and data-sampling queries. A Proof Sketch al-
lows the parties in the computation to verify that the final
result cannot have been maliciously perturbed by more than
a small error bound with high probability; when this is not
the case, targeted network forensics can be used to identify
the node(s) responsible for tampering. The basic technique
combines Flajolet-Martin (FM) sketches [6] with compact
cryptographic signatures to prevent overcounting; a simple
query complement scheme can be used on top of that to pre-
vent undercounting. Using this building block, we are able
to support verifiable random sampling as well, which can
be used in a broad range of applications for verifiable ap-
proximate query processing. To our knowledge, this is the
first practical work to tackle verifiable, multi-party query
processing in the face of adversaries. It is only a first step,
however, and we foresee more work to be done on verifiable
distributed queries.
In fact we are convinced that ϕ opens up a host of new
challenges at the boundary between query processing and
security, not only in terms of verifiability. Another chal-
lenge is to ensure that query specification cannot be used as
a weapon: it seems rather easy to specify a distributed query
that produces the effect of a Distributed Denial-of-Service
(DDoS) attack on an unsuspecting host, for example. This
problem has yet to receive attention in the research litera-
ture, but it comes up quite naturally if one believes that data
integration and peer-to-peer querying are likely to succeed.
3.4 Protocols, Not Systems
The database community has a long tradition of building
large, complex systems. This tradition is ill-suited to the
design of networked systems. Monolithic systems are typi-
cally designed around explicit software modules that export
function-call interfaces. By contrast, networked systems are
designed around protocols that are often implemented in
many ways by different parties. The realities of protocol
design enforce a methodology that monolithic-system de-
signers do not typically follow. First, and most obviously,
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protocols have to be concise, since they determine the mes-
saging overhead in a system, and the main technical docu-
mentation burden. Second, protocols have to be simple and
clear in their semantics, so that different implementations
can interoperate and provide proper behavior. Third, and
most importantly, protocols have to be very explicit about
exception handling and asynchrony. The endpoints of the
protocols are autonomous, and possibly faulty or even ma-
licious. They may not respond at all. They may respond
late, or more than once, or out-of-order. These consider-
ations motivate considerable care in thinking through the
possible states of the protocol. Protocol design is often done
with a mind toward adversarial participants, which is good
software-engineering methodology.
Another advantage of designing a system around protocols
is that it enables independent innovation at the endpoints.
This has been important throughout the history of the In-
ternet, in the development of software for tasks like e-mail,
netnews and the Web. The next Grand Challenge for the
database community would do well to embrace this approach.
Unlike in Operating Systems, the database community has
not developed a culture in which most research is done in
the context of a single open-source system. Instead, vari-
ous groups tend to implement (and re-implement) their own
software stacks. This culture of competition goes back a long
way in the community, and has both merits and demerits.
Assuming that it is a reality that needs to be acknowledged,
it can be mitigated by building multiple independent soft-
ware systems that communicate via open shared protocols.
The ϕ vision pushes database-systems research squarely in
this direction. The network is at the heart of the system,
as the basic data source, the indexing framework, and the
main performance bottleneck. Moreover, the peer-to-peer
architecture discourages complex, monolithic, centrally ad-
ministered software, in favor of simple software that is man-
ageable by end users. The vision of a massive P2P query
system with a well motivated application may be the com-
munity’s best chance to leverage each other’s systems work.
3.5 Uncertainty, Heterogeneity and Data Re-
duction
Traditional database users have long known that their data
is not perfect: it often contains incorrect, missing, and con-
tradictory information. Various means have been employed
to mitigate this problem over the years, including integrity
constraint checking, form-based data entry, and a variety of
relatively ad-hoc data-auditing and data-cleaning tools.
In our era of extensive data collection and integration, these
techniques have been stretched to the limit. As a result,
probabilistic reasoning has, perhaps inevitably, made its way
into the database community as a first-class research topic.
This is a welcome expansion of the community’s agenda, and
an ambitious one. The integration of logic, probability, and
scalable systems is an enormous challenge that should keep
the community busy for some time.
As of now, most of the work in this area is theoretical, and
discussion is underway on issues including semantics, data
modeling, and query languages. The community has just
begun to dig into core issues of managing the statistical cor-
relation models used in modern Machine Learning in the
context of a “probabilistic database” [5]. There is a lot
of excitement about the database community’s potential to
contribute on challenges in the architecture and scalability
of probabilistic tasks like learning and inference, but this is
as yet a long-term goal. Part of the nascent debate has to do
with the diversity of the scenarios being tackled, including
the handling of explicitly uncertain observations recorded as
data, the integration of “soft” ranking-based systems with
“hard” logical query systems, and the acquisition and stor-
age of noisy sensor data [7].
The ϕ context provides a number of opportunities and con-
straints in this regard that make it an attractive focus ap-
plication for investigating probability in queries. Data pro-
duced by endpoints in ϕ will certainly be noisy. Measure-
ments will often be missing. It is unreasonable to expect
every single node on the Internet to participate in the sys-
tem, therefore much traffic will be unobserved. Those nodes
that do participate may selectively contribute information
for reasons of performance or policies such as privacy. Mea-
surements will also often be erroneous. Some of the data
will be events from tools like firewalls that have false pos-
itives and negatives. More difficult, some of the data will
come from adversarial nodes, who will attempt to “poison”
the system with false data for various unseemly purposes.
However, there is quite a bit of structure in Internet traffic
that makes it much simpler to handle than almost any other
realistic application domain. The scope of semantic hetero-
geneity in Internet traffic is limited by the fact that all the
parties have already standardized on simple data formats
in order to interoperate. The entities and relationships de-
scribed in Internet traces are relatively modest. The most
basic data used in network monitoring consists of IP ad-
dresses and standard IP packet headers. Moving up the
stack, some centralized techniques capture the parameters
of standard protocols such as HTTP, SMTP, BGP, etc., as
well as simple metadata for Internet Service Providers such
as their geographic location. Finally, there are a few dozen
endpoint tools that produce simple alerts based on traffic
analysis, including firewalls and virus detection tools. (The
leading firewall warehouse, DShield, ingests some four-dozen
formats worldwide.) It has been shown that effective use
can be made of machine-learning methods to combine the
results of noisy Boolean alerts across multiple machines [4].
The combination of modest heterogeneity and a realistic ap-
plication with real data makes ϕ an attractive setting for
exploring more complex probabilistic queries in the context
of data that is integrated from many sources.
Moreover, the underlying statistical properties of Internet
traffic, while rich, are far better studied than most previ-
ously proposed applications of probabilistic databases. Ex-
isting (mostly centralized) intrusion-detection systems pro-
vide pragmatic statistical models and best practices for iden-
tifying “suspicious” Internet traffic. More generally and sci-
entifically, the Internet Measurement Conference produces a
steady stream of research results on the shifting properties of
various aspects of Internet traffic. This modeling energy can
be directly harnessed in ϕ’s massively distributed setting.
Another opportunity in the ϕ context is that communica-
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tion constraints on the system will highlight linkages be-
tween data reduction (a topic the DB community has stud-
ied deeply) and statistical inference (largely explored by
other communities). Data reduction is a problem of com-
pactly modeling data distributions to minimize storage, ac-
cess and communication costs. Statistical reasoning typ-
ically uses compact models both to better describe data,
and to more efficiently run inference algorithms. There has
been almost no connection made between our own commu-
nity’s powerful data-reduction techniques, like sketches [2,9],
and statistical inference algorithms like junction trees [21] or
loopy belief propagation [20]. This is a rich area for algorith-
mic investigation that arises naturally in ϕ, where statistical
inference and data reduction are both required.
Finally, network intrusion detection and health monitor-
ing are ongoing areas of application development. It is
well understood that the outputs of such a system must
be taken with a grain of salt, and there are no expecta-
tions of database-style “correctness.” Moreover, there are
centralized intrusion-detection systems against which to (a)
benchmark the quality of traditional analyses performed in
a distributed system, and (b) highlight the additional power
of new tools and techniques from the database research com-
munity. There are few other realistic settings in which new
probabilistic database techniques for structured data can be
set in relief against the state of the art.
4. WHY US?
The importance of Internet security is no secret. The prob-
lem has been receiving significant attention in both academia
and industry for some years now. So it is worthwhile asking
what the database community brings to the problem, and
whether other research communities have already effectively
staked out this territory.
First, it is clear that this problem does not belong to the
database community any more than it does to any other re-
search cluster. Malefactors on the Internet do not respect
the boundaries between ACM SIGs, and the urgency and
persistence of the problem stresses the need for collabora-
tion across the broad computing community. This promotes
some positive outcomes for computing in general, and for the
database community in particular. It should force meaning-
ful collaborations between researchers in data management,
security, networking, machine learning, theory of computa-
tion, distributed systems and programming languages, to
name a few natural groups. It is not a coincidence that the
author list of this paper spans a number of these areas.
Second, it is apparent to all of us that database research does
indeed have quite a bit to offer to network-security prob-
lems. A brief survey of research on network security high-
lights a significant need for expertise in distributed query
processing and data reduction in particular. One example of
this is the DOMINO network-security project at the Univer-
sity of Wisconsin [31], which envisions building something
akin to a small PHI infrastructure, but leaves the archi-
tecture and algorithms for general distributed query pro-
cessing for network security largely unspecified. There are
many other such examples that either propose very special-
ized data-processing algorithms for point problems, or that
leave query-processing architectures and algorithms to fu-
ture work [12,15, 27]. The design of a powerful distributed-
query and alert infrastructure for network security is clearly
desirable but poorly understood today. Such an infrastruc-
ture has to deal meaningfully with many of the challenges we
enumerated above. That effort can be significantly acceler-
ated via leadership from the database community, while also
engendering collaborations between databases and a number
of other fields.
5. THE METACHALLENGE
It is one thing to present a challenge and label it “Grand.”
It is quite another to get critical mass within the community
working on it. In our own discussions, we puzzle over this
metachallenge.
Given interest from a few parties in the community, there
are some intriguing recent models that might be worth con-
sidering as a group. The first is PlanetLab [22], which was
an open effort – seeded with industrial funding – that got a
consortium of researchers from a number of institutions to
collaborate on a software platform that would enable their
work. Such a consortium is conceivable in the ϕ context
for designing protocols for distributed querying and min-
ing, and for building reference implementations for some of
them. A more traditional academic model is the one used by
Project Iris, which focused on DHTs. This effort assembled
a group of faculty at five different institutions to apply for
significant federal funding, while at the same time starting a
new conference (IPTPS). This led to a strong and sustained
focus in the research agendas across these groups and oth-
ers as well, though it did not lead to a great deal of shared
code. This model is a bit more difficult to repeat in the cur-
rent research funding climate. A third model is to go out-
side the research community for a time and instead push a
prototype through the open-source community, perhaps via
the Apache Foundation Incubator, or in partnership with a
related pre-existing open-source project like SETI@Home.
Having done this, the resulting artifact could be used as a
platform for researchers.
We eagerly welcome discussion from colleagues on both these
metachallenges, and on the ϕ challenge itself.
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